It is often claimed that international investment arbitration is marked by a revolving door: individuals act sequentially and even simultaneously as arbitrator, legal counsel, expert witness, or tribunal secretary. If this claim is correct, it has implications for our understanding of which individuals possess power and influence within this community; and ethical debates over conflicts of interests and transparency concerning 'double hatting'-when individuals simultaneously perform different roles across cases. In this article, we offer the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the individuals that make up the entire investment arbitration community. Drawing on our database of 1039 investment arbitration cases (including ICSID annulments) and the relationships between the 3910 known individuals that form this community, we offer the first use of social network analysis to describe the full investment arbitration community and address key sociological and normative questions in the literature. Our results partly contradict recent empirical scholarship as we identify a different configuration of central 'power brokers'. Moreover, the normative concerns with double hatting are partly substantiated. A select but significant group of individuals score highly and continually on our double hatting index.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is regularly but anecdotally observed that international investment arbitration is marked by a 'revolving door.' Single individual actors play multiple roles as arbitrators, counsel, expert witnesses, and tribunal secretaries within this fragmented and ad hoc adjudicative system of investment arbitration. The movement between roles may be sequential 1 or even simultaneous. The latter practice is often referred to as 'double hatting' and has attracted significant criticism on the grounds of conflict of interests.
2 However, the nature and extent of the revolving door in international investment arbitration has never been empirical determined and its sociological and normative implications remain largely unexplored.
This article presents the first ever analysis of the entire international investment arbitration community since its inception. It draws on our PITAD 3 database of 1039 international investment arbitration cases and ICSID 4 annulment proceedings in order to first map the identity and relationships of 3910 individuals in their different roles, using social network analysis and various indexes. In addition, we examine sociologically whether the revolving door phenomenon challenges our understanding of who has power within the international investment arbitration community; and we empirically assess normative concerns over double hatting by determining the extent to which it occurs and whether the practice has eased or worsened over time.
In doing so, we seek to advance the existing literature on international investment arbitration in three discrete ways. Our first contribution is descriptive. By focusing on a broad group of actors, we partly return to Dezalay and Garth's vision of the 'field' as the analytical unit. The focus is less on specific institutional roles (particularly those of the arbitrator), but instead the 'networks and relationships organized' around arbitration and the 'space for positions and struggles'. 5 To be sure, Dezalay and Garth were significantly concerned with arbitrators. After extensive empirical work they observed that a coterie of 'grand old men' dominated the field of international commercial arbitration. 6 Small in number, linked closely, and mostly European, they even referred to themselves as a 'club' or a 'mafia'. 7 After a period of 'generational warfare', these figures were joined and complemented by AngloAmerican arbitration technocrats and law firms. 8 Since then scholars have continued to map the field with a focus on gender, nationality, education and employment background. 9 Recent medium-N surveys confirm elite educational backgrounds and male and Western identities of arbitrators, 10 but also the possible rise of a third and more pluralistic generation of managerial arbitrators within commercial, but not investment treaty, arbitration.
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However, Dezalay and Garth's work also showed the peculiar symbolic (and legal) capital of those actors that crossed institutional lines. They devoted significant space to the role of legal counsel, law firms, and witnesses and noted implicitly the potential role and power of a revolving door. One vignette is telling: an AngloAmerican litigator, with his first case in international commercial arbitration, learnt the importance of appointing distinguished arbitrators as counsel. With the 'combination of Lalive and Goldman' he commented, 'I was a conductor of virtuosos and prima donnas.' 12 Thus, we map the roles of all types of actors in investment arbitration and provide the first quantitative perspective of the field and empirical estimation of the revolving door. In doing so, we also identify key attributes of all actors such as gender and nationality. 13 Our second contribution is to build on sociological work that seeks to identify who has the power in the investment arbitration community and the extent of that power. In Dezalay and Garth's account, power was measured in largely qualitative termsan actor's symbolic capital. This power was determined by the combination of 'social class, education, career and expertise', which aspiring arbitrators needed to optimally combine in order to project neutrality, competence, and authority.
14 Puig, however, provides an essentially quantitative perspective of power in his recent social network analysis of investment arbitrators. By counting the number of roles and different types of ties between arbitrators, power is measured by an individual's exposure in the system. 15 Tracking all arbitral appointments at ICSID between 1972 and 2014 he identifies a core of approximately 25 arbitrators whom he calls 'power brokers'. 16 Notably, with the exception of a few 'formidable women', Puig found that grand old men from Europe and North America continue to 'dominate the arbitration profession'. 17 He argues that the maintenance of a core over a long period may support Ginsburg's theory that the imbalance in appointments is a result of strategic action: that the rapid global spread of arbitration incentivizes insider arbitrators to raise the barriers to keep out new entrants.
Using social network analysis, our study builds on Puig in order to better understand the biographic dynamics of this core group. However, it differs in three important ways. First, we analyze a much larger dataset, which includes non-ICSID casesroughly doubling the sample size. Second, we expand the actors to include all known legal counsel, expert witnesses, and tribunal secretaries. 18 In our view, Puig undercounts the importance of legal counsel and expert witnesses in the system. Not only are legal counsel tasked with directing much of the cases, they are also deeply involved in arbitrator appointments-they are the key gatekeepers in the system. This methodological innovation also means we are able to reflect anew on existing explanatory theories of monopolistic behavior in the arbitration market. We can highlight and quantify the role of legal counsel in strategic and (often undervalued) structural explanations. 19 Third, we weight the different roles of arbitrators. As far as we have determined, Puig has equally weighted presiding arbitrators and claimant/respondent-appointed wing arbitrators. Yet, the president of an arbitration represents the most prestigious role in arbitration, possesses the most responsibility in case management, and exercises the most influence in the final decision as they are usually not appointed solely by one party. In light of this, we weight arbitrators differently and thus introduce a more qualitative measurement of power -recognizing that the symbolic capital of a presiding arbitrator is higher than a wing arbitrator. In doing so, we avoid an anomaly produced by Puig's method, in which some wing arbitrators have a rank that does not intuitively cohere with their actual power in the system.
Our final contribution is to ground normative debates on double hatting in an empirical reality. Various scholars have raised concerns with conflicts of interests about arbitrators simultaneously acting as legal counsel and arbitrator in different cases. 20 However, the extent of double hatting has never been measured. It remains the subject of anecdote and casual observation. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to hear claims that the practice is decreasing over time with the implication that the ethical concerns are less sharp today -but no evidence is offered for such assertions.
Determining the nature and extent of double hatting is particularly important in the current political climate. Concern with this practice has strengthened the many contemporary critiques of the investment arbitration system; and will become even more relevant as investment arbitration continues on a growth trajectory (in terms of the annual number of cases filed). Many of these critiques focus on the arbitral system. provides the most complete and comprehensive publicly available registry on arbitral appointments, legal counsel, and tribunal secretaries, that data on ICSID arbitrations will be more complete than that of all non-ICSID arbitration. In this respect, the study illustrates the benefits of datasets as they grow in size: see discussion by Wolfgang Alschner, Joost Pauwelyn, and Sergio Puig, 'The Data-Driven Future of International Economic Law', [THIS VOLUME]. 19 See discussion of the results on power brokers in Section IV. 20 See Sands, 'Conflict and Conflicts', above n 2; Sands, 'Geopolitics', above n 2; Judith Levine, ' 26 These critiques all share with double hatting a similar concern: the closed nature of the community and its ability to engage in self-dealing.
Moreover, these critiques have all contributed to the so-called legitimacy crisis in investment arbitration. With over 831 known investment treaty arbitrations initiated to date (almost all coming in the past 15 years), 27 and a significant number of instances in which the threat of treaty arbitration has been used, states hosting foreign investors are increasingly finding themselves having to defend their laws and policies before and in the shadow of international arbitral tribunals. In addition to the process of legitimacy concerns above, States and other stakeholder have raising concerns over outcomes. Arbitration awards have been perceived as excessively pro-investor, 28 pro-investment, 29 and anti-developing state. 30 Thus, a failure to clarify or address a process legitimacy concerns such as double hatting only compounds the sense of crisis.
This article proceeds as follows. In Section II we describe the international investment arbitration regime and present our dataset. In Section III we set out data separately for each of the four types of roles and analyze their relative importance through social network analysis and/or case ranks. In Section IV, we bring the roles together to analyze the entire field and examine who are the power brokers in the community.
In Section V, we analyze the extent to which double hatting is occurring and whether there is real cause for normative concern.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REGIME The modern international investment regime can be described in multiple ways, but generally includes the international institutions and rules governing the regulation of trans-border investments. Built on a network of more than 3,500 signed bilateral investment treaties (BITs), regional free trade agreements (FTAs), 31 and a handful of plurilateral investment treaties, 32 the regime gives a foreign investor a number of substantive protections and rights, 33 including most importantly, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions. While this regime has its roots in the immediate postWorld War II period, it was not until the 1990s that the annual number of international investment agreements (IIAs) exploded.
For the purposes of this article, we are focused on the institution of, and networks arising out of, international arbitration between a foreign investor and the state hosting their investments: this prominently includes ITA, but can also include cases arising out of contracts or concessions and/or a host state's foreign investment laws. An ITA case commonly arises when a foreign investor alleges that the beneficiary rights they are granted under an IIA has been breached by the state hosting its investments. Investment arbitration can also occur in cases between foreign investors and host states under arbitration agreements allowing for investor-state arbitration (as embedded in various forms of investment contracts or concessions) or national foreign direct investment (FDI) laws. These particular forms of arbitration are often administered under ICSID. But they can also arise under ad hoc procedures or the rules of international commercial arbitration centers.
We have tracked and coded all these cases in our new and first-of-its-kind database (PITAD). It includes all known treaty-based arbitrations, all ICSID contract and FDI law-based arbitrations and all ICISD annulment committee proceedings; and each case is coded for up to 138 different variables. The dataset would ideally include all international commercial arbitrations and all non-ICSID contract-based investment arbitrations, but given the default confidentiality of such processes, the data available remains far from complete or accessible. 34 In any case, our dataset has a certain coherence. It covers all known cases whose legal claim is procedurally or substantively based on an international treaty: whether through the ICSID Convention and/or various IIAs. This consequent 'public law' nature of the arbitration arguably heightens concerns around transparency and conflicts of interests raised by the revolving door phenomenon. 35 However, the number of international investment arbitrations arising out of contracts or FDI laws pales in comparison with the exponential increase in investment treaty-based arbitrations over the past two decades (see Figure 1) . In fact, the most distinct feature of this treaty-based regime is the explosion of litigation. It is this meteoric rise in the instances of ITA over the past two decades that has led some to claim there is 'no other category of private individuals' that are 'given such expansive rights in international law as are private actors investing across borders'. 
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Prior to the year 2000, there were only a small number of ITA cases registered.
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These cases raised seemingly few concerns and went largely unnoticed by the international legal community. This changed at the beginning of the millennium as the annual number of ITA cases surged, with an average of 40 cases per year in the 2000s, and 50 cases per year in the 2010s. Of the 831 treaty-based cases registered to date, 111 different states have acted as respondents, compared with claimants from 67 different home states; 38 and by the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the use of ITA had become a global, prominent and lucrative area of international adjudication, while at the same time coming under increasing scrutiny from a growing number of states, scholars, and civil society actors.
By comparison, the number of ICSID-based contract or FDI law arbitrations have totaled 118 to date with an average of about five cases registered per year since the first case in 1972. 39 While the initiation of non-treaty based ICSID cases still occurs, these cases only comprise less than 10% of the ICSID caseload today. In addition, there have been 90 ICSID annulment committee cases registered over the past two decades (see also Figure 1 ). Under Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention, a party may seek an annulment of their award on one of five narrow grounds: the arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted, it exceeded its powers, it failed to give reasons, it was tainted by corruption, or there had been a serious departure from a rule or procedure. While these annulments concern existing litigation, they are staffed with a new arbitration panels and are thus included as separate cases.
Not all of the cases have been concluded and claimant-investor success rates vary. Of the 949 international investment arbitration cases that have been registered (treaty-based, ICSID contract-based, or FDI law-based) as of 1 January 2017, the outcomes are as follows:
40 419 have been concluded, 41 301 remain pending, and an additional 229 were settled or discontinued. Of the concluded cases, claimantinvestors have won on the merits in 47% of cases and lost on jurisdiction or the merits in 53%. The remaining 'cases' are the annulment. Of these, 41 have been concluded, 14 remain pending and an additional 25 have either been settled or discontinued. Of the concluded annulments, 32% resulted in a full or partial annulment of the underlying case and 68% in rejection of the annulment request.
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III. MAPPING THE ACTORS
In this section, we identify and map the individuals in each actor role in international investment arbitration: arbitrators, legal counsel, expert witness, and tribunal secretary. This mapping is partly done by a simple count of number of cases and an identification of attributes such as nationality, gender, legal role, and/or institutional role. In addition, we provide a separate social network analysis for arbitrators. A full social network analysis of the entire community is undertaken in the next section.
Social network analysis constitutes both a theory and a method. 43 Theoretically, social network emphasizes the importance that ties between individuals may have for their behavior and and transmission of 'resources.' This pattern of relations may also provide either opportunities for, or constraints on, individual action, which is especially relevant in the case of a market such as international investment arbitration. Methodologically, social network analysis provides tools and measurements for visualizing and understanding the relationships between individuals and similar individuals. The core of such methods are nodes (in our case individual actors) and edges (relationships between individual actors participating in the same arbitral dispute). Social network methods also provide the opportunities to measure different aspects of network centrality. In this respect, social network analysis theory is an ideal method to analyze the arbitration community: almost all observers note the important role of networks in securing appointments.
To be sure, network analysis is not only relevant to social relations between legal actors. As two other contributions in this volume demonstrate, it can also be used to understand and explain legal citation patterns. However, the underlying theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches remain the same for both types of network analysis and all three papers foreground centrality.
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A. Arbitrators
In international investment arbitration, each party to the dispute will customarily appoint one of three arbitrators; and in many cases the parties (or the co-arbitrators) will jointly appoint the presiding arbitrator. However, there is a large degree of variation in the manner of appointment. While the default is that the parties will appoint the two wing arbitrators, the presiding arbitrator can be appointed by the parties, the two wing arbitrators or by the institution hosting the arbitration. For ICSID annulment committee cases, all three annulment committee members are appointed by the Secretary-General of ICSID.
Of all the possible configurations for the appointment of arbitrators in international investment arbitration cases, however, there is an underlying constant: all arbitrators are selected for a particular dispute on an ad hoc basis. This structure means that for every arbitration, there are individuals (either the parties, legal counsel representing the parties, arbitral institutions or co-arbitrators) that are making selection decisions for each of the 1039 cases in our dataset.
The top 25 arbitrators by numbers of appointments are listed in Table 1 There is a familiar pattern of well-known grand old men and two 'formidable women' (Stern and Kaufmann-Kohler), as Puig christened them. With the exception of four arbitrators, all those listed are nationals of Western states. Yet, even these four are not particularly representative of the rest of the world. The single arbitrator from Eastern Europe, Alexandrov, has been a resident in the USA for almost three decades-with education and employment experience from US institutions. 45 The other three are from high income Latin American states, and either live or have their professional practice based in the US or Western Europe. Most of these top 25 arbitrators also have a sizeable number of influential and prestigious presiding chair appointments. Only three are consistently appointed by the claimant (Brower, Alexandrov, and Na on) and three consistently appointed by the respondent (Stern, Thomas, and Sands). The number of total appointments of this group is also formidable. The top 25 arbitrators account for 4% of all investment arbitrators (629 in total) but are represented in just over a third of all arbitral appointments (991 of 2676) in our dataset.
We now conduct a social network analysis of this community or investment arbitrators. In Figure 2 , we provide a visual representation of this network. This diagram charts the centrality of the arbitrators according to the number, place, and weight of their edges. As foreshadowed, we have weighted arbitrators slightly differently from Puig. The relationships are weighed according to a relationship matrix where a discount is given depending on the perceived importance of the role in relation to the other nodes, role, and allegiance. For arbitrators, this weighting is directed so that a single working relationship between two arbitrators will have two unique scores. In the case of a presiding arbitrator and a wing arbitrator, the president's relationship will be given a score of 1 while the wing arbitrators' relationship will be given a score of 0.75, reflecting the perceived discrepancy of power between the roles. These weighted and directed relationships form the basis for the two subsequent scores-Page Rank and HITS Hub. 46 While describing these scoring systems in detail is beyond the scope of this article, both are cumulative ranking systems that use every possible path in the graph to determine the relative importance of the node. The HITS Hub score expands on page rank including a measure of consensus between the nodes and ranks it according to the total accumulative value of the relationships that the node owns. The figure maps the community according to the HITS Hub score. This is because it measures the importance of the relationships, and hence the power that any given arbitrator can likely assert. Eyeballing the map suggests an inner core of influential arbitrators followed by a second ring of arbitrators. We therefore test the presence of a strong core-periphery by presenting an alternative visualization in Figure 3 . As with Figure 2 , names are scaled according to their HITS Hub score. Each arbitrator is ranked counterclockwise according to the same ranking. The inner circle compromises of the top 25 arbitrators found in Table 2 . The diagram illustrates the substantial weight of relationships between the top 25 arbitrators as well as their consistent dominance of roles in comparison to the rest of the network.
A closer inspection of the figures shows why some international investment arbitrators feature prominently in the network analysis. In Table 2 , we rank the top 25 arbitrators according to their spatial influence in the network. The table presents four factors for evaluating an arbitrator's importance; degrees-weighted and unweighted, Page Rank, and HITS Hub score. The table is ranked by the HITS Hub score. Examining the results, the order changes in comparison to the number of appointments (compare columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 ). Some regularly-appointed arbitrators drop out of the top 25 appointment list completely (see Table 1 ) while others such as Stern, Brower, Thomas, Paulsson, and Cremades drop down on the rankings. The reason is clear on closer inspection. Arbitrators which predominantly represent one party in arbitration (i.e., they are primarily appointed by either the claimant or respondent) drop down the ranking. Notably, this is only partly a function of the different weightings. It also occurs because wing arbitrators tend to be further out in the network compared to those who have a more even representation in terms of appointments (i.e., those that are appointed as either presiding arbitrator, claimant-appointed arbitrator, or respondentappointed arbitrator). Thus, the pattern of their connections and subsequent connections revealed that predominantly party-appointed arbitrators were not as close to the core.
For the sake of comparison, we also provide the arbitrator's rankings from Puig's analysis (based on the degrees score). 47 This shows the difference gained in adding non-ICSID cases and in weighing presiding and wing arbitrators differently. While our general rankings are not totally dissimilar from Puig's unweighted network analysis of ICSID cases, 48 we have uncovered some new and important arbitrators in the top 25, including Price, Park, Riga Sureda, and Gaillard. These arbitrators frequently are chosen to arbitrate in non-ICSID cases. Another interesting distinction is that some arbitrators that rank highly on Puig's scoring, drop down the rankings considerably in our index (compare columns 1 with 3 in Table 2 ). For example, Cremades, Paulsson, and Tercier are significantly lower in Puig's ranking when compared with ours (largely a function of taking few arbitral appointments in the past two to three years). Contrariwise, Lowe and Veeder jump up nearly a dozen places. These shifts are attributable to differentiated scoring (Lowe and Veeder primarily act as presiding arbitrators) but it is also a function of the increased number of appointments that these arbitrators have received in the past two to three years.
49
B. Legal counsel
We now turn to the role of legal counsel in the international investment arbitration network. They represent a paradox. On one hand, they are numerous. We have identified 2699 distinct lawyers that have represented claimants and respondents: see Figure 4 . On the other hand, there is a core of lawyers who dominate the caseload. Only 14% (382 lawyers) have litigated more than two cases, while only 1% (the top 25) have litigated more than 13 cases: see Table 3 . A member of this top 1% of 51 Tellingly, the only two non-Western legal counsel that have represented claimant-investors in international investment arbitration cases are long-term residents of the US (Alexandrov) and France (Gharavi), with elite education from these states. Moreover, a number of top arbitrators also feature on this legal counsel list; 52 and we will return to this important revolving door phenomenon in the next section. The one (slightly) positive sign of diversity in this group concerns women. Compared to the arbitrator cluster, they are better represented with five of the top 25 being women (20%). 53 The final feature worth noting is the role of the law firms of legal counsel. Anglo-American and French laws firms dwarf the list-even for counsel that represent predominantly respondent states. Only four of the top 28 have spent some time as governmentemployed counsel and only one exclusively so-the last legal counsel on the list.
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C. Expert witnesses Expert witnesses have not been a focus in previous studies of the international investment arbitration community. 55 However, in constructing the PITAD database, we were continually surprised by the regular appearance of familiar names amongst the expert witnesses. Moreover, some of this expert advice addressed rather pedestrian points in international investment law. On its face, it was not why such caliber of expert testimony was required. Our suspicion was that parties were also using leading figures (often other arbitrators) as part of a symbolic strategy, something that Dezalay and Garth also found in their interviews. To be sure, expert witnesses possess more than symbolic power, particularly if they are the only expert witness on a particular point or they are providing valuations for the damages/quantum phase of the arbitration. The material and legal power of these expert witnesses in the system should not be undervalued. Table 4 ranks the top 25 expert witnesses according to their number of appearances in international investment arbitration cases. It is notable that only five expert witnesses have appeared more than five times and together account for 82 cases (11% of all known expert witness appearances and more than half of the top 25). They appear to play an almost orator-like role in the system. Two of these experts are quantum/industry experts (Kaczmarek and Abdala); and three are international law academics (but also arbitrators: Reisman, Dolzer, and Schreuer). Of these, three have appeared for both claimants and respondents on a relatively regular basis. Moving to the top 25, we see a pattern of almost exclusively Western expert witnesses and only one woman (Slaughter). Given the number of female professors in international economic law and public international law, this low usage of female international law expert witnesses is quite striking. Although, it may not be surprising given numerous psychological studies concerning gender cognitive bias in assessing the reliability of witnesses. 56 The same could be said of the absence of non-Western international law professors. Indeed, the regular selection by legal counsel and law firms of Western male expert witnesses implicitly suggests what international investment arbitrators view as credible. It also may also give credence to the hypothesis (and indirect evidence) of a possible cognitive arbitral bias against less developed states in international investment arbitration. D. Tribunal secretaries Finally, we include tribunal secretaries. While often invisible to the outside world, the role of tribunal secretaries in shaping and influencing international litigation has gained increased scholarly and political attention. While earlier studies indicated that their role was largely confined to the non-substantive parts of award drafting, 58 recent accounts suggest that tribunal secretaries may be more influential. Table 5 ranks the number of tribunal secretaries-in the 568 cases in which we have information. Notably, the top 25 are responsible for administering 68% of these cases. Interestingly, it is only at this point that we see any signs of gender or regional diversity-a majority are women and slightly more than half come from nonWestern states.
57
59
60
IV. WHO ARE THE POWER BROKERS?
The previous section mapped the different actors in the system. We now draw this mapping analysis together to analyze the investment arbitration community as a whole, and focus on the issue of power. As discussed in the introduction, we seek to measure power in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Quantitatively, we count the number of cases and connections as a measure of institutional power. Thus, individuals who are regularly engaged in international investment arbitration have the opportunity to exercise significant material influence in the system. Moreover, high numbers of appointments in any role usually increasing the chances of future appointment-a sign of symbolic power.
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Qualitatively, we are concerned with shading the degree of material and symbolic power that comes with a particular position in arbitration. Thus we further expand our relationship matrix to facilitate the perceived variances of influence between the different roles and the parties they represent. This weighting attempts to normalize and avoid overemphasis of lesser roles in the system. Therefore, we rank arbitrators higher than counsel and counsel higher than tribunal secretaries and witnesses. In addition, we assign further weights for distance between actors, according to the structure of arbitration.
These weightings are of course somewhat arbitrary but we describe and justify them as follows. First, as discussed above, presiding arbitrators are given a weighting of 1 and wing arbitrators (0.75). Second, we weight counsel at (0.5) but introduce also a distance weighting. We weight the relationship between a claimant counsel and claimant-appointed wing arbitrator at (1.25); yet for the same claimant counsel and the respondent arbitrator we weight the relationship at (0.75). The former is done because the relationship is close (and one is involved in nominating the other), while the latter is done because the two actors are much further apart. The same logic is applied in reverse to a respondent counsel. Third, we weight tribunal secretaries at (0.375) and witnesses at (0.25). We also apply distance weightings to the expert witnesses. Thus, the relationship between a claimant witness and claimant counsel is weighted at (1.25), but (0.75) for a claimant witness and respondent counsel.
Based on this methodology, we can identify the power brokers in the system. In Table 6 , we provide a new and alternative picture of the most powerful actors. For certain actors, there is a clear jump up the ladder. Arbitrators that have worn multiple hats or individuals with other hats constitute this surging group. They have served as 60 It may be that there is a selection bias. Most of the publicly available information about tribunal secretaries comes from ICSID cases, which are hosted by the World Bank. This institution has a partial commitment to regional diversity as an intergovernmental organization. However, we note that women appeared to be well-represented in many arbitration centers along with increasingly a greater number of nonWestern nationals. But this is a subject for further investigation. 61 See extended discussion in St. John et al., above n 12.
Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration 319 both legal counsel and arbitrator (e.g., Alexandrov, Crawford, Price, Paulsson, Gilliard, and Schwebel); both expert witness and arbitrator (e.g., Reisman); or frequently as tribunal secretaries (e.g., Alvarez-Avila and Flores).
The existence of a differently configured group of arbitrators allows us also to revisit existing explanatory theories on arbitrator selection. Importantly, our findings highlight the often implicit but under-emphasized role of counsel and others in those explanations. As noted earlier, Ginsburg's theory emphasized strategic action and the use of barriers to keep out new entrants. However, it was Roger who noted the role of information asymmetries as a key strategic entry barrier. Information asymmetries are typical of ad hoc systems and benefit all insiders, and she noted the role of counsel and tribunal secretaries. 62 Indeed, one arbitration lawyer recently boasted that their competitive advantage lies in what is 'not written down'. 63 Thus, the existence of a core group of counsel, which includes a significant number that also act as arbitratators, may enhance the maintenance of those information asymmetries. Moreover, Rogers highlighted two structural factors that shape the imperfect competitive nature of the arbitration market. These are the (i) role of insiders in making arbitration appointments 64 and (ii) lack of regulation (with an absence of legal/judicial oversight and little room for reputational sanction). 65 The existence of a strong core group beyond pure arbitrators accentuates potentially both aspects. First, legal counsel and tribunal secretaries are pivotal in making or influencing appointments. They are the clear power brokers in the first phase of an arbitration. Indeed, we might speculate that a revolving door increases incentives for a special form of oligopolistic behavior: making appointments in expectation of a return favor. In future research, we will test the likelihood that counsel nominate arbitrators that may be more likely to appoint them when these arbitrators act as counsel: a reciprocal revolving door. Second, the closeness and ties in the community may not incentivize public reputational sanctions. The power that insider legal counsel hold in appointments may strongly disincentivize critique. In other words, those who are too critical can be quickly subject to exclusion or relegation to a wing arbitrator role.
Thus, by foregrounding the role of the broader arbitration community we can enrich existing theories about the arbitration market. It especially allows us to identify the deeply embedded power brokers who may determine the ability of outsiders to enter and insiders to remain.
V. DOUBLE HATTING
We now turn to the question of whether there is double hatting-the simultaneous fulfillment of two roles, especially arbitrator and counsel. The issue of whether it is acceptable for an individual to sit simultaneously as an arbitrator in one case and act as legal counsel in another case has been the subject of a long-running and heated debate within the international commercial arbitration community; 66 and it moved to center stage with the rise of treaty-based arbitration in the 2000s. Critics of the international investment arbitration regime have continually pointed to the legitimacy concerns that arise when a system of adjudication permits adjudicators to act as arbitrator in one case and as legal counsel in another. One of the interesting points about the legitimacy of this double hatting issue in international investment arbitration is that it is not only subject to criticism from the outside, but is a practice where insiders in the community have remained actively split over the past decade.
Leading the charge against the practice of double hatting from the inside is Sands, who over the past decade has repeatedly written and lectured about the legitimacy concerns tied to double hatting in international arbitration. 67 For Sands, the conflict issues that can arise are relatively clear:
it is possible to recognise the difficulty that may arise if a lawyer spends a morning drafting an arbitral award that addresses a contentious legal issue, and then in the afternoon as counsel in a different case drafts a pleading making arguments on the same legal issue. Can that lawyer, while acting as arbitrator, cut herself off entirely from her simultaneous role as counsel? The issue is not whether she thinks it can be done, but whether a reasonable observer would so conclude. Speaking for myself, I find it difficult to imagine that I could do so without, in some way, potentially being seen to run the risk of allowing myself to be influenced, however subconsciously. 68 While acknowledging that many of his colleagues believe that they can effectively separate the different roles that they may play in different arbitrations, Sands articulates that this practice nonetheless is not good for international arbitration. It can never fully shield itself against questions of perceived bias. In terms of legitimacy for the system, it is a practice that should be avoided. 69 Likewise, Judge Thomas Buergenthal of the International Court of Justice, in a 2006 lecture, summarized the issues that can arise when arbitrators act simultaneously or sequentially as counsel:
I have long believed that the practice of allowing arbitrators to serve as counsel, and counsel to serve as arbitrators, raises due process of law issues. In my view, arbitrators and counsel should be required to decide to be one or the other, and be held to the choice they have made, at least for a specific period of time. That is necessary, in my opinion, in order to ensure that an arbitrator will not be tempted, consciously or unconsciously, to seek to obtain a result in an arbitral decision that might advance the interests of a client in a case he or she is handling as counsel. ICSID is particularly vulnerable to this problem because the interpretation and application of the same or similar legal instruments-the Bilateral Investment Treaties, for example-are regularly at issue in different cases before it [. . .]. These revolving-door problems-counsel selecting an arbitrator who, the next time around when the arbitrator is counsel, selects the previous counsel as arbitrator-should be avoided. Manus manum lavat, in other words-you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours, does not advance the rule of law.
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While Sands, Buergenthal and others have highlighted why the practice of double hatting is ethically undesirable for arbitrators and legal counsel to practice, it is not uncommon to hear arguments that support the practice, and these arguments draw principally upon structural and economic claims. Firstly, they hold that there is a relatively small pool of arbitrators that can sit in these types of arbitrations and that limiting qualified individuals from sitting as arbitrator due to work as legal counsel would undermine the quality and rigor of the adjudicators acting in the current system. 71 Secondly, they claim that that there is an economic argument for not limiting the practice of double hatting: many legal counsel seeking to become full time arbitrators cannot justify giving up their counsel practice when there is no guarantee that arbitral appointments will come in the future. 72 Therefore, under this scenario, it is inevitable that some double hatting will occur during the transitionary period between the time an individual acts primarily as counsel to the time that they become a full-time arbitrator.
Empirically speaking, the first of these arguments would only hold for the 1990s. Since then, the potential pool of investment arbitrators has expanded significantly. And while there may be a shortage of qualified arbitrators in other fields such as international commercial arbitration, 73 investment arbitration appointments are viewed as highly prestigious.
74 Investment arbitration is a buyer's market not a seller's market. It is also not clear how far the second argument extends temporally. Once counsel has obtained their first or even second arbitrator appointment, they could desist from accepting future counsel appointments as they ease into a new role.
Ethically speaking, however, both of these justifications for the practice are rather unpersuasive, given that, at a minimum, the practice of double hatting can reasonably give raise to questions of potential or perceived bias or conflict. And these appearances of bias or conflict that can arise in this context are not merely hypothetical. There are a number of examples where the double hatting problem has become the subject of formal challenges.
This classic example involves French arbitrator Gaillard and an international investment arbitration case (Telkom Malaysia v Ghana 75 ), where he was acting as the claimant-appointed arbitrator at the same time that he was also acting as claimant's counsel in an ICSID annulment proceeding in a different case (RFCC v Morocco 76 ). Even though Gaillard disclosed that he was acting as counsel in the ICSID annulment case, the respondent state (Ghana) in the arbitration where he was acting as arbitrator lodged multiple challenges against him in the Hague District Court 77 (Netherlands was the seat of the arbitration) alleging that his role as arbitrator was incompatible with his simultaneous role as counsel in the ICSID annulment case, especially due to the fact that both cases involved similar legal issues and that Ghana 71 On this point, Barton Legum, a prominent counsel and arbitrator based in Paris, has noted that: 'the pool of qualified arbitrators is already "vanishingly small" and that it would be problematic for the users of the arbitration system if efforts were made to exclude all practicing BIT counsel from this pool.' Peterson, above n 65. 72 'I have a lot of sympathy for those who say you need arbitrators with skill and experience. How on earth does somebody get established as an arbitrator if he or she never gets a chance to start? So I think inevitably there has to be some overlap. was relying on the case of RFCC v Morocco in its submissions. Ghana argued inter alia, that Gaillard, 'who in his capacity of counsel opposes a specific notion or approach, cannot be unbiased in his judgment of that same notion or approach in a case in which he acts as arbitrator'. 78 The Hague District Court ordered Gaillard to choose whether to continue as arbitrator or counsel, but not both. Gaillard subsequently resigned from this position as counsel in the ICSID annulment proceedings.
Even if Gaillard was able to separate his different roles in different cases, this example highlights, at a minimum, that an appearance of bias or conflict was reasonable, even if there was no showing of actual bias. Ultimately, this challenge to Gaillard was resolved through his resignation in one of his roles; however, it is important to note that neither the various arbitration rules (i.e., ICSID, SCC, 79 ICC, 80 and UNCITRAL) nor the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration explicitly prohibit this practice. 81 While the IBA Guidelines do not provide bright line rules preventing arbitrators to act simultaneously as counsel, the IBA Guidelines are clear on the arbitrator's role in cases where justifiable doubts arise in regard to the arbitrator's independence or impartiality. The IBA Guidelines on issues of conflict of interest states:
(a) An arbitrator shall decline to accept an appointment or, if the arbitration has already been commenced, refuse to continue to act as an arbitrator, if he or she has any doubt as to his or her ability to be impartial or independent; (b) The same principle applies if facts or circumstances exist, or have arisen since the appointment, which, from the point of view of a reasonable third person having knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances, would give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence [. . .]; (c) Doubts are justifiable if a reasonable third person, having knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances, would reach the conclusion that there is a likelihood that the arbitrator may be influenced by factors other than the merits of the case as presented by the parties in reaching his or her decision.
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In cases where an arbitrator is acting simultaneously in another case as counsel, there are situations-as highlighted in the above example-where an appearance of bias or conflict arises to the degree where a reasonable third person would have justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence. Yet, the IBA Guidelines are just that: guidelines. They do not create clear legal obligations on arbitrators that can be sanctioned. As a result, the international arbitration community must rely to a degree on 'self-regulation' or 'self-policing' if the practice of double hatting is to be minimized in the short-term.
Nonetheless, our concern is not to resolve this debate but rather assess empirically the extent to which double hatting actually occurs in international investment arbitration; and to propose some ways in which the practice could be minimized. In determining the existence of double hatting, we have developed a customized algorithm. Through a multi-factor calculation, we determine an all-time score for each individual and an annual score.
The double hatting index is calculated as follows. If a person in a given year is involved only as either arbitrator or legal counsel, i.e. is wearing only 'one hat', the individual is not assigned any points. If, however, she or he is involved with a minimum of two investment arbitration cases in a minimum of two different roles, then a 'yearly score' of (2) is assigned to that individual for a given year. The score does not attempt to describe the intensity of double hatting within a calendar year, and hence the maximum score an individual can receive for a year is (2). Cases are included in the evaluation from their constitution date and until they are either discontinued, settled or finally resolved through a decision in the form of an award. Cases that are pending as of 1 January 2017 have a concluding date as of 1 January 2017 for the purposes of our analysis. Our double hatting index is a somewhat conservative measure. It does not take into account potentially multiple conflicts of interests (due to appointments in many cases). Figure 5 lists the top 25 according to those criteria (the full list is set out in Annex I). The top four places go to actors that we have already identified as power brokers in the international investment arbitration community. These are Gaillard, Paulsson, Crawford, and Hobér. This group all has scores over 30, which means considerable double hatting over a long period of time. However, there is a considerable group hot on their heels with 20 arbitrators with scores over 20. Some of these are prominent arbitrators but many also represent a new generation of actors that may be transitioning to full time arbitrator roles (i.e., Silva Romero, Bishop, Heiskanen, and Douglas). It is also interesting to note that those arbitrators which have made However, it is not uncommon for the international investment arbitration community to claim that the problem of double hatting has been decreasing over time. Our index above is ahistorical and measures cross-sectionally double hatting. Thus, in Figure 6 , we have calculated the double hatting index over time for the top 25 arbitrators and for all arbitrators.
The yearly results in Figure 6 suggest that there has not been a significant decrease (or increase) over time. Instead, the phenomenon for the top 25 double hatters appears to have been relatively stable since 2005-hovering between scores of 35 and 50 with only a slight decline over the past decade. It is much less stable for other individuals with a large rise up to 2014 and then a strong fall. Thus, it seems too early to conclude that there has been a dramatic change in the practice. There appears to be a select group of arbitrators that frequently double hat as legal counsel.
In order to make this continuous practice of the top 25 double hatters clear on an individual basis, we have tracked each year of their double hatting (Table 7) . What is particularly notable is that those who have ceased double hatting in the last three to four years have largely ceased taking cases new cases as either arbitrator or counsel as they reach retirement age (i.e., Cremades, Schwebel, El-Kosheri, and Hertzfeld). However, in some other cases, the lack of double hatting in the past few years is probably more likely the result of: having a sufficiently large caseload as arbitrator as to preclude the time or economic necessity to act as counsel simultaneously (i.e., Hanotiau), or being appointed as judge to the International Court of Justice (i.e., Greenwood and Crawford), which restricts counsel work during the time that the individual is on the bench. Therefore, it does not appear that the individuals ceasing to double hat over the past few years are making this choice as a response to the ethical or conflict issues that have arisen in the discourse critiquing the practice. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this article was to present a preliminary assessment of the complete network of actors in the international investment arbitration community to date. Instead of focusing on one group or type of actors within the regime, we have sought to provide a comprehensive map of all relevant actors and their roles in order to identify those actors which move between different roles and even wear multiple hats simultaneously (double hatting).
What we find is that the 1000-plus international investment arbitration cases to date have involved almost 4000 known individuals and that within this select group of individuals there is a prominent core that is both highly influential and powerful within the system. Our social network analysis suggests a deep set of 'power brokers' across the field, as those passing regularly through the revolving door score quite highly on our measures of power. This suggests that an analysis of power cannot be constrained to the arbitral role. As we have highlighted, the key explanatory theories of the uncompetitive nature of the arbitration markets implicitly or explicitly take into account this structural feature.
In terms of double hatting, we find that the practice continues to exist. In reality, it is a very small group but it is constituted by highly influential and well-known individuals. In other words, double hatting is not a common or widespread practice across the entire network of cases (i.e., breadth), it is practiced so consistently by a highly visible and powerful core of some of the most influential actors in the system (i.e., depth). Given that critiques of double hatting focus on the perceived bias and lack of impartiality, independence and legitimacy that such a practice can have on the reasonable outside observer, its prevalence amongst influential actors is questionable even if there is a debate on its actual effects on independence.
Turning to reform, if about 10 to 15 individuals agreed to stop double hatting, it is highly probable that the major critiques against its practice would evaporate. While it would be preferable for the legitimacy of the system for top double hatters to selfregulate in this manner, there are potential rule changes that could mandate the termination of this practice. One way would be to include a double hatting ban in new IIAs that have been signed (as for e.g. in the recent CETA 83 ) or through a reform or modification of the institutional rules governing the vast majority of these arbitrations. 
